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Yet Schmitz's conclusion calls attention to one important consequence of the 
consistent U.S. attempt to use "moral arguments and appeals to gain public 
support" (308) for its foreign initiatives. By opening the discourse of U.S. 
foreign policy to moral argumentation, this policy remains subject and 
vulnerable, itself, to moral judgment. 
Steven S. Volk 
Oberlin College 
Stephen G.  Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John E Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
Without the Soviet Union as an alternative model, Latin American nations 
increasingly imitate the United States. But "Tio Sam" frequently sends mixed 
messages regarding public policy toward Central and South America. During the 
Cold War, U.S. decisions proved particularly difficult to decipher. President John 
F. Kennedy's interrupted administration especially defied easy analysis. In the 
book, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, Stephen G. Rabe argues that 
President Kennedy's Latin American relations generated conservative, even 
reactionary, forces. In dealing with these nations, Kennedy may have allowed 
anticommunist fervour to ovemde promotion of democracy, constitutionalism, 
capitalism, and social justice. 
Although U.S. resistance to communism initially prompted Kennedy to 
advocate reform in Latin America, fear of instability inspired ultimate acceptance 
of military or dictatorial rule. The young president asserted leadership in a global 
struggle against communist regimes. When several Latin American dictators lost 
power in the late 1950s, Kennedy encouraged democratic capitalism for these new 
governments. The young president promoted a balance of free-market principles 
with progressive taxation and moderate government regulation. Kennedy believed 
that this "New Deal9'-style approach would bring social justice, legitimate and 
stable regimes, and resistance to communist appeals and insurrections. Excessive 
apprehension about short-term instability, however, ultimately motivated 
Kennedy's Latin America policy. According to Rabe, Kennedy favoured pro- 
United States dictatorial and military governments rather than leftist democratic 
regimes. Socialist leaders who refused to denounce communism never inspired 
the confidence of U.S. officials. If the United States could not guarantee a Latin 
American leader's anticommunist credentials, therefore, Kennedy favoured order 
rather than democracy, constitutionalism, and decolonization. 
In Rabe's interpretation, Kennedy's support for military rulers and 
counterinsurgency doctrines left a reactionary legacy. To avoid disorder and 
communist revolution, Kennedy tolerated authoritarian regimes in the Dominican 
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Republic, Haiti, and Peru. In Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala, the United States 
hnded opposition movements against democratically elected governments that 
resisted Kennedy's isolation of communist Cuba. Kennedy opposed democracy 
and British decolonization in Guiana due to fear that communists would dominate 
an independent republic in this area. Only leaders in Venezuela and Chile attracted 
Kennedy's fill support because these rulers more consistently cooperated with 
U.S. opposition to Fidel Castro's Cuba. The United States military even trained 
Latin American armed forces to suppress domestic rebellions. Whlle U.S. officials 
claimed that such contact would transfer democratic ideas to Latin America's 
armies, Rabe challenges this opinion. 
Rabe's book would well serve upper-level undergraduate and graduate 
courses in U.S. diplomatic relations, but requires balance from Latin American 
and non-government perspectives. Rabe holds Kennedy's administration 
responsible for Latin America's most unfortunate consequences. According to 
Rabe, Kennedy substantially contributed to a legacy of authoritarianism in recent 
Latin American governments. Local and national sources nonetheless have begun 
to reveal many restraints on the United States. Central and South American 
leaders frequently rejected U.S. attempts to negotiate. While we should require 
accountability from U.S. diplomats, each nation's own national citizens and 
officials bear the ultimate burden for providing good government. Forthcoming 
studies of private actors, and the interaction between state and society, would also 
broaden understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations. In this period, for 
example, Kennedy's friend and Boston Archbishop Richard Cardinal Cushing 
sponsored U.S. Catholic missionaries to Peru and Bolivia. A forthcoming study 
reveals that these Vatican representatives often promoted Tio Sum-style 
democracy more than religious tenets. Scholars need to explain how presidential 
policy either countered or complemented such messages. Such contributions 
would further discussion of the U.S. role and responsibility in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
The United States and Latin America share several traditions that encourage 
cooperation. In both regions, European customs and a Catholic faith remain 
rooted in the culture. Modern technological, cultural, and economic changes also 
promote connections in the Western Hemisphere. Post-Cold War North America 
has integrated into a common market that may expand to Central and Southern 
nations. Immigrants from Latin American nations increasingly contribute to U.S. 
politics and culture. Rabe's book offers insight into a critical period in U.S.-Latin 
American relations. While Rabe concludes that the United States wrongly 
imposed a Cold War lens when fashioning Latin American policy, scholars require 
fiuther study of diverse sources to determine whether U.S. actions ultimately 
aided or antagonized Latin American nations. 
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